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Abstract
Ruptures represent the pertinent cause of scientific progress. On the one hand, such 
“scientific breaks” demarcate one type of scientific discourse from another, while 
simultaneously always putting in place some specific ideological aspect of the sci-
ence in question. They consequently suture a determinate scientific totality, one that 
always reflects and serves the ruling class—be it a worldview or a concrete research 
programme. The article will attempt to trace the notion of value in different eco-
nomic discourses to outline the historical discontinuities between them. The sub-
sequent aim is to explore the genealogy of quantitative and qualitative determina-
tions of value (ranging from Smith and Ricardo, through Marx, all the way to the 
marginalists). We will do this by highlighting a shift in the methodological approach 
of the object of knowledge—a parallax shift of object—i.e. between the positivist 
and dialectical grounding of notions. In the first part, the paper tracks the impasses 
arising from the move to mathematized economics via a “marginalist revolution”. 
In the second and third part, it proceeds with examining the rupture in “objective” 
and “subjective” aspects of value, reviewing different positions from Marx’s value 
form (as sensuous–supersensuous thing) and A. Amonn’s compromise based on the 
“social” form to F. A. von Hayek’s and mainstream economics’ embrace of the price 
form. The article concludes with a reaffirmation of Marx’s critique of the specific 
structure of the capitalist mode of production, one in which the subtraction of the 
abstract/general (“Real abstraction”) is central to a synchronous structure of eco-
nomic categories. It remains the only genuine critical assessment of such a rupture 
within the domain of economic scientific strata.
Keywords Value form · Price form · Karl Marx · Alfred Amonn · Economic 
epistemology
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1 Introduction
Recall the old parable from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations about a butcher 
who seldom sees his beef or his mutton directly exchanged for either bread or 
beer. Instead of bartering, he brings the products of his labour to the market and 
exchanges them for money, but only just so he can immediately use it as a means 
for acquiring other products of labour from his fellow workers. His commodity is 
being exchanged on the market for money, as if it were a completely natural and 
historically universal task. On the other hand, his actions seem to emerge from 
some unconscious habit, creating a kind of routine, changing forms from a money 
commodity to other commodities, back and forth. But what did the butcher have 
to do beforehand? He had to invest his own physical body, time, and energy in 
a determinate work activity to produce a finished product, one that could be 
exchanged on the market. Smith’s use of such rudimentary parables uncovers the 
simple grounding and justification for his labour theory of value, i.e. production’s 
concord with human activity, the metamorphoses of merchandise into different 
commodities, and the site of their circulation and exchange—the market. Where 
once we encountered shepherds, blacksmiths, and porters, today we see new pro-
fessions, such as influencers, fitness and lifestyle coaches, personal data manag-
ers, and so on. However, their actions remain much the same; they all bring to the 
market either their crafted products or, as is more usual today, their know-how, 
while the unfortunate ones can still offer only their own work-capacity—being 
free to possess and make use of their own labour-power—for exchange among 
equal but diversified merchandise.
It does not really matter who the individual subjects, whether early craftsmen 
or today’s service or knowledge workers, are. This simple story depicts the very 
persistence of the dynamic in a historical mode of production, i.e. the capital-
ist mode of production, nowadays conveniently and metonymically referred to 
as the market economy. It encompasses all the required economic categories 
and principles necessary to understand the basic working of a classically-con-
ceived market-evolved community. Smith also makes it obvious from the outset 
that for him, labour represents the prime category, on which all other catego-
ries rest. The labour category not only entails the true essence of man, or con-
versely, his abilities to reap the wealth of nature, for Smith it also possesses the 
predicate of labour’s continuous divisibility. This attribute can be conceived as 
the general contribution to the evolution of eighteenth-century capitalism: the 
division of labour as a core principle and rationale for new economic organi-
zation of productive forces in a new becoming of civil society. One has to ask 
whether the labour category was introduced and discursively centred by Smith 
only to derive its much more powerful correlate, that of its division, resulting in 
the everlasting specialization of work. The division of work processes into more 
elementary activities can be seen through a historical analysis, where it was soon 
obfuscated by a different and complimentary process, namely automation and 
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standardization. It, for example, induces individuals to acquire new skills, neces-
sary for them to achieve higher productivity. As was true in Smith’s lifetime, so it 
is today: this process enhances the comparative advantages of whole nations. At 
the heart of it all lies the fundamental (philosophical) principle of self-interest; 
individuals and their atomized dexterities provide for better quality final products 
and through exchange result in rising utility for everyone.
A further point. Before individual labour creates utility by consuming its results, 
it more significantly represents the sole source of value. Now, this category of value 
is of quite a particular character, since it embodies a scission (before drawing on 
antagonistic opposites in dialectics)—an opposition between use value of the prod-
uct (utility) at its consumption stage and exchange value relating together other 
commodities (power of purchasing) at a preceding stage of exchange on the market. 
If labour time is the concrete sole source of value, why do then the commodities 
exchanged on the market need a price tag? Why not just use invested work hours to 
evaluate their exchange values? Smith was fully aware of the fact that people have 
different talents and levels of skill and knowledge, i.e. specialization, that makes 
this kind of scaling and comparisons both qualitatively and quantitatively difficult 
and undesirable. Eventually, price-mediated exchange comes to the fore, bringing 
alongside it the money commodity, a pure metal, a simple coin, a paper banknote, 
cryptocurrency, etc.—the means of measure in exchange and payment. Smith’s pro-
posal has come full circle: production (labour and its division)—circulation (spe-
cialization of skills and tasks)—distribution and exchange (exchange values, prices 
and money on the market)—consumption (utilities or/and re-entry into production). 
The dialectical interplay between nature appropriation, along with labour capacity 
and its division, brings us successively to price-mediated money market exchange. 
A word of caution is pertinent for that particular time of classics: the principle of the 
division of labour and its magnitude do not yet give the final answer on how people 
come to intersubjectively value their products of labour.
In this article, we will try to trace, illuminate and articulate the “scientific break” 
from the objective to subjective value that occurred when economic science pro-
gressed from its classical period, proceeding by its critique (of political economy) 
and finishing up with the marginalist revolution. This body of theory and discourse 
remains prevalent today in economic historiography. The first part of the article will 
examine historical cornerstones and steps that constitute the ‘Accepted view’ of this 
transition, pertaining to the times before Alfred Marshall finally put all the frag-
mented pieces into his Principles of Economics. A special section will look at the 
old mercantilist and subjectivist line of argument that led to the complete abolition 
of the labour theory of value. We touch upon the rise of Walrasian equilibrium and 
expound on the undecidability of a general equilibrium point in terms of its comput-
ability, examining the consequences of this fact for the category of value. A fur-
ther sub-section will move the debate to a modern-day setting with Friedrich A. von 
Hayek and the individual’s planning at heart of today’s broader mainstream orienta-
tion. The second part will seek to extricate the return to value form from the present 
price form by tracking qualitative changes (from objective to subjective and back) 
relating to Karl Marx’s notion of relations of production and Alfred Amonn’s social 
relations among individuals. What connects the first and the second part is a crucial 
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qualitative loss/subtraction in conceptuality observed in these ‘scientific’ historical 
shifts. Our thesis and elaboration in the third part will be that this endless displace-
ment is a consequence of inadequate concept-building, one that can be theoretically 
outlined with the misapprehension and loss of the concept of real abstraction in eco-
nomic science—a problem already highlighted by Marx and emphasized by Theo-
dor W. Adorno and “The New Reading of Marx”.
2  A brief and historically ʻacceptedʼ overview of the concepts: value 
and price
An irritating question remains unresolved to this today: what are the underlying 
conditions that establish the relations of exchange between one commodity and 
another? Smith’s unambiguous answer was the magnitude of labour embodied 
in either of the final products. This leads us to the next question: Is the value of 
grain the same regardless whether the fields experience a season of drought or one 
with significant precipitation and sunshine? Smith wittingly escapes this quandary 
by positing that actual value depends on “the higgling and bargaining of the mar-
ket”, separating value based on labour from market-determined value. We again see 
the argument reduced to the known paradox of water and diamonds, i.e. use and 
exchange value. Marx was one of the least inclined to this explanation, hence his 
endeavour to demystify the relation of substance in his famous passage “why this 
content assumes that form”, deploying the categories of abstract labour, socially 
necessary labour time and so on. While we will come back to this, we must first 
focus on the emergence of the utility theory, originally and significantly proposed by 
Ferdinando Galiani and the Italian mercantilists of the eighteenth century. For the 
first time, value became a purely subjective category, relating determinate amounts 
of one product and another. According to these interpretations, the relative scarcity 
and utility constitute the ultimate grounds for commodity values. Hereafter, the 
economist’s tale of value becomes historical and natural; from Daniel Bernoulli’s 
hypothesis of the logarithmic (expected) utility function to a re-discovery of utility 
theory in the works of William Stanley Jevons and Carl Menger. As to Jevons, his 
thoughts on the magnitudes of value stem directly from Jeremy Bentham’s pleasure 
and pain principle, introducing an individual’s solemn experience of consummate 
objects. Recall that Jevons in The Principles of Political Economy posits use value 
as roughly equivalent to cardinal utility, while exchange value is used to describe the 
relation between two commodities in their mutual and quantitative exchange rela-
tionship—exclusively a ratio of different units of measure in exchange (e.g. a tonne 
of pig-iron being equal to an ounce of standard gold). On the continent, Menger is 
known for directly linking the immediate causal chain of human wants with want-
satisfying things, i.e. goods threading a network of interrelated ratios in a system 
of social exchange. We can deduce two unique motives for economics from this: 
(1) the scarcity of physical quantities of goods and (2) a subject’s ability to identify 
and rank his needs. Once these have been cast as scientific preconditions, all of the 
classical economics from Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and all the way to Marx collapses 
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with the consequential abolishment of labour as substance of value, but also with the 
doing away of any problem of the form.
Needs, utilities and ratios relying on prices are everything one needs to explain an 
intuitive equilibrium in exchange—neatly formalized in a textbook equation:  MUA/
PA =  MUB/PB …  MUX/PX.
The discipline of economic inquiry renounced, in the name of its scientific char-
acter, its essential symbiosis with labour and opted for Jevons’s three axioms of 
value:
(1) Value in use = total utility.
(2) Esteem = final degree of utility.
(3) Purchasing power = ratio of exchange.
One asks themselves whatever happened to Smith’s conjecture that
“Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the 
only accurate, measure of value, or the only standard by which we can com-
pare the values of different commodities, at all times, and at all places.” (Smith 
1937: p. 36).
Value has in retrospect ceased to be universally determined by labour (Smith) or 
according to (relative) exchange values in relation to scarcity of labour (Ricardo), 
now being wholly determined by subjective factors of pleasure and pain, as well as 
esteem and usefulness (textbook economics).
2.1  The path of the nineteenth century subjectivists: Léon Walras 
and the consequent problem of computable undecidability of a general 
equilibrium
Meanwhile, in Lausanne, Switzerland, Léon Walras set himself the task of scien-
tifically incorporating human needs, relative scarcity, and prices of inputs and 
outputs into a coherent and closed system of general equilibrium. The system of 
equations and the mathematical turn had a double aim: (1) to affirm the scientific 
character of economic categories as scientific concepts organised as laws and (2) 
to outline a general circuit from production to consumption in a steady state. At the 
time, the general maxim was that axioms, laws and proofs are to be regarded as 
headlamps for a pure economic science—achieving the same standards as astron-
omy, mechanics, physics and mathematics—in such a way as to together sustain an 
empirically rational methodology of economic phenomena. Herein the category of 
value becomes subsumed under the system of linear equations constituting general 
equilibrium, where absolute quantities and relative (price) ratios are now the prime 
objects. Walras remains faithful to Galiani when he posits that “the scarcity is per-
sonal or subjective, while exchange value is real or objective.” (Walras 1926: p. 103) 
Value is then determined by the unity of subjective scarcity and a good’s relative 
capacity of being exchanged on the market at a certain price. Once such a definition 
of value is in place, there appears a common denominator in the form of a utility/
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price ratio for all tradable goods, as well as those of inputs (land, labour, capital)—it 
follows that heterogeneous qualities become homogenous objects. Menger made the 
last sundering act by installing a disjunctive fusing of the classical dichotomy of 
use and exchange value simply into a concept of economic value, doing away with 
and rendering opaque any substance attributed to value. Further still, and similarly 
to the purely subjectivist Menger, the logician Jevons reproached this same process 
by deductively subsuming qualitative predications into classes under the concept. 
If we take the notion of value, we can derive qualities such as use, exchange, eco-
nomic, utility… all of which can be summarized in different classes of qualities that 
are ad hoc determined, but can also be omitted from manipulating quantitative vari-
ables in equations, because only numeric operations on different quanta are needed. 
Such bracketing of qualitative attributes of categories opens the path to exclusive 
numerical calculus—what we have gained is the quantitative dynamic of catego-
ries, the arithmetic and algebraic operations while retaining their qualitative (brack-
eted) determinations (Jevons 1890). This is likewise the perspective that separates 
Jevons’s method from the one used by Walras: while the former always subordinates 
mathematics to deductive logic—his handling of qualities and quantities making use 
of logical operators –, the latter relies on mathematical algebra and calculus for sort-
ing economic categories in a quantitative and systematic manner, turning them into 
economic laws on the principle of free competition—e.g. the outputs of exchange, 
based on price variables and ratios between different goods. What both have in com-
mon is that value appears to them only by being mediated through price ratios.
Economic science always had the propensity to seek an appropriate scientific 
model by which it could (re)present itself. The list at the time was inexhaustible 
and ranged from Newton’s Principia, Faraday’s laws of electromagnetic induction or 
electrolysis, all the way to the laws of thermodynamics. But what has differentiating 
between objective and subjective conditions actually lead to? There remains a mini-
mal gap when one considers both the objective and subjective character1 of value 
popping out of price-mediated exchange. No such thing is possible in Menger’s 
strict universe where exchange is understood solely subjectively. The objective con-
ditions of value, i.e. labour, that appeared in the works of Smith and Ricardo were 
on the other hand also tied to capital, represented as the value of production costs. 
Unfortunately, only a handful of critical economic historians nowadays share the 
view that they are important. Marx, being the last to concur with this fact, by intro-
ducing the notion of abstract socially necessary labour in relation to the concrete 
labour-time, he followed all the way through the evolution of objectivity of value. 
It has to be said that Jevons and Walras had moved somewhat closer to objectiv-
ity,2 claiming there are some intrinsic qualities in exchanged goods, but which, how-
ever, are neither logically significant nor can be mathematically quantified, leaving 
Menger with the extreme position of a subject’s judgement of taste when it comes 
1 Even before the marginalists of the nineteenth century, it was already present in the writings of the Ital-
ians (B. Davanzati, G. Montanari, F. Galiani), the French (J. B. Say, F. Quesnay, A. R. J. Turgot, É. B. de 
Condillac), and others (Schumpeter 1987).
2 Roughly demarcating Jevons and Walras from Menger’s more radical views.
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to valuing goods. The question spans economic history, going from Ricardo to Mill 
and the Marxists, to neo-Ricardians, such as Piero Sraffa, and marginalists: How 
does one get from values to prices (exchange ratios)? For Menger, this is a triv-
ial problem, a specific occurrence traced to the current state of market forces, the 
demand and supply of active participants, making the issue irrelevant. He thought 
he had resolved the problem by positing a new notion of economic value. The mat-
ters are slightly different for Jevons and Walras. Remember, they do not share the 
synthetic notion of economic value; for them the utility theory with the postulate of 
scarcity also rests on costs of production that combine in exchange ratios, reflected 
in prices and consequently in general equilibrium. In the end, prices are the form of 
appearance of production costs (the supply side) and relative utilities in satisfying 
needs (the demand side). And Alfred Marshall has, instead of finally resolving the 
subjective–objective character of value in any applicable way, rather provided his 
scissor metaphor of subjective value and objective costs, thus mystifying the debate 
even more with his temporal analysis (Marshall 1959). Nevertheless, as noted by 
Schumpeter, the marginalists have “in other words, […] established what A. Smith, 
Ricardo and Marx had believed to be impossible, namely, that exchange value can 
be explained in terms of use value.” (Schumpeter 1987).
The “marginalist revolution” at first hand signified the transition from an objec-
tive to a subjective theory of value, whereas it later primarily became the name of a 
new economic scientific paradigm. Mathematized economics, now relying on equa-
tions of marginal units—products, costs, revenues, etc.—and ending with a gener-
alized science of equilibrium models under different conditions (free competition, 
monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, etc.) The transition from pure to 
applied economics resulted in the complete abolition of the initial division in value 
(use-value and exchange-value), for there was now only economic value leading to 
the deduction of prices in a complete price system based on the law of diminishing 
returns. Walras made it his modus operandi, operating with absolute and differential 
quantities and equations:
Strictly speaking, it is quite sure that value does not exist: there are only ratios 
of values or prices. But I have proved in my Éléments d’économie politique 
pure, or in the first four memoirs of my Théorie mathématique de la rich-
esse sociale, which resume it [i.e. the Éléments], that these ratios of values or 
prices are mathematically equal to the ratios of the intensities of the last wants 
satisfied, i.e. of the raretés for each consumer. In the first two memoirs, I have 
established that this equality occurs in the exchange of two commodities as 
well as in the exchange of several commodities for one another (Walras 2005: 
p. 4).
A quick view of today. Looking back, we see just how far things have progressed 
since the introduction of Walrasian (analogue computational) equilibrium, which 
was later reconfigured and modified into a contemporary economist’s toolkit: we 
have seen the rise of contemporary rise of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium 
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(ADGE), Scarf’s development of computable general equilibrium (CGE) theory, 
Kydland and Prescott’s work on the real business cycle (RBC), and the emergence 
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) via the recursive competitive 
equilibrium (RCE). What made a general equilibrium, with all its variants, possible 
is the ability to locate an equilibrium point, in CGE for example, by means of equat-
ing Brouwer’s Fixed-Point Theorem3 with the Walrasian Economic Equilibrium 
Theorem (proved by H. Uzawa’s Equivalence Theorem4), which also underlays, for 
example, Samuelson’s Economics. Kumaraswamy (Vela) Velupillai’s ground-break-
ing research on computability and algorithmic mathematical economics (Velupillai 
2012) in hindsight uncovered the questionable estimating calculations of equilib-
rium via fixed points in economic model-building, and hence further philosophical 
implications. Using recourse theory, he shows that the fixed point’s equivalents to 
general equilibrium5 are actually unconstructifiable, and thus incalculable and/or 
undecidable. In terms of our discussion, we are suddenly faced with the following 
issue: what is the epistemological wager of these mathematical fallacies? In con-
temporary philosophy, mathematics plays an important role: either to be understood 
as the formalization of the real (J. Lacan) or as the science of being qua being (A. 
Badiou). Accordingly, we will come to understand it here as a verifying (algorith-
mic) machine—uncovering flaws in the conceptual development of fundamental 
notions (value, price, money, equilibrium, etc.). Mainstream economics has once 
again dropped the ball (as in the case of value). It completely neglected and obfus-
cated emerging problems, this time using the above equivalence notions, regardless 
of the premises they depend upon. On the other hand, Marx was much more aware 
of the importance of not leaving notions undetermined or even omitted, wittingly 
devising them within a different epistemological structure, one we will examine in 
detail later on.
2.2  The path to the present: F. A. von Hayek and the problem of pure 
subjectivism
There is one more figure we particularly have to credit for the contemporary hegem-
ony of the price form. An heir to Menger’s Austrian tradition, but among others 
also an adherent to E. Mach and L. Wittgenstein, i.e. the Vienna Circle philosophi-
cally and F. Knight, G. Stigler and the Chicago camp economically—Friedrich A. 
von Hayek. His sceptical Kantianism—neo-Kantianism married with positivism—
towards any objective essence in the world, i.e. any uncovering of necessity in the 
character of things is untenable, since the world as we perceive it is exclusively the 
5 Relying on the usage of the axiom of choice (Zorn’s lemma), law of excluded middle and the law of 
double negation.
3 Formally: Let f: S → S, where f is continuous. Then, there is p*  S, such that p* = f(p*); the simplest 
statement of this theorem goes as follows: if we have a function mapping from S into itself there exists an 
element where f(x) = x – a fixed point.
4 A Theorem introduced by Hirofumi Uzawa (1962). It equates the Walrasian Equlibrium Existence 
Theorem with the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. For criticism see (e.g. Tanaka 2009).
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creative activity of our minds, only spurred on the primacy of the subjective expe-
rience. He promulgates this by denying any underlying grounds for distinguishing 
between essence and appearance. What we are dealing with is just the mind and 
its ability to organize sensory experience into constructed reality by means of sub-
suming it under concepts. He consequently took into account and managed to avoid 
the pitfalls of naïve empiricism inherent in the neoclassical naturalized-science par-
adigm. Our minds endlessly construe our sense-experience; first into abstractions, 
defining concepts by directly accessing the concrete world, while on the other hand 
explicitly rejecting any transcendental departure point. For Hayek, this is how a sci-
entific discourse should be structured, to give meaningful propositions about human 
affairs and turning away from any content-form gap. We shall not delve into Hayek’s 
elaboration of psychological and neurological systems introduced in The Sensory 
Order, where he goes further in adding that our perception and experience are sub-
ject to a continuous loop of evolution and re-adaptation of concepts, clearly against 
rationalistic (Cartesian) universality of laws and axioms governing our minds. We 
will glance at his price system, which is understood as an expanded-knowledge form 
of an individual’s relations. Price form nonetheless remains the representational 
and mediating form in Hayek’s price system, since it tells us about our preferences, 
wishes, needs, desires, tastes, etc.—an individual’s plans for their mutual exchanges 
and balances. The transmission of knowledge in Hayek’s view has to be a decen-
tralized/detotalized process of individual acts: Hayek demonstrates this by explicitly 
drawing a parallel between the division of labour and the division of knowledge. The 
crucial point of departure for us here is twofold: first, examining what Hayek calls 
the axiom of Pure Logic of Choice or the rough equivalent to “economic calculus”, 
and second, how raw sensory data experience, according to him, distributes knowl-
edge and information according to an individual’s conditions, ways of handling with 
scarce things. The thesis we are putting forward here is that the price form is in this 
sense ex ante reduced to a ‘private’ reflection of an individual’s knowledge.
The axiom of Pure Logic of Choice affords to the economic calculus of individ-
ual action the classical assumptions of perfect knowledge, known preferences, and a 
definite amount of scarce resources brought together in a static temporal-spatial con-
stellation. In mainstream economics, it assumes the form of a mathematic-logical 
equilibrium of particulars and is later extrapolated to a general equilibrium. Hayek, 
on the contrary, regards such a ‘scientific’ equilibrium to be utterly inadequate, since 
it does not take into account the dynamic circumstances of an individual’s informa-
tion, knowledge and plans about objects.
Economic calculus encounters no barriers whatsoever; as we have already argued, 
quantitative relations of value are determined by marginal rates of substitution and 
subjective evaluation of preferences in the form of a numerical index(es) of price(s) 
in a price system. The new substance of the price form is now shifted to informa-
tion and knowledge, considered as the ‘value’ of the object of exchange. The dis-
persion of information among interested individuals becomes the inevitable prem-
ise driving the exchange process. Only interested individuals are the subject of any 
particular exchange of goods, as they are the only true knowing subjects about all 
the properties necessary to signal the relevant price of a good. Take for instance the 
demand for copper; everybody who needs it, knows exactly what quantity they need, 
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the current supply on the local and global markets, and the effective demand and 
spot prices, in the end forming their particular demand plans for the realization of 
a purchase or sale. But, according to Hayek, modelling this behaviour in economic 
theory, as is done in mainstream economics, represents an a priori logical operation 
of pure choice, devoid of any empirical content when it comes to the analysis of a 
society’s actions. On the other hand, we are faced with a price system qua “com-
munication system” of information. The prices ‘in our heads’ are our consciousness’ 
reflection on the market status. Here is how Hayek understands the problem and 
seeks a solution to avoid “scientism” of complex social phenomena:
These systems [Walrasian or Paretian systems of equations] show merely the 
principle of coherence between the prices of the various types of commodi-
ties of which the system is composed; but without knowledge of the numerical 
values of all the constants which occur in it and which we never do know, this 
does not enable us to predict the precise results which any particular change 
will have. Apart from this particular case, a set of equations which shows 
merely the form of a system of relationships but does not give the values of the 
constants contained in it, is perhaps the best general illustration of an explana-
tion merely of the principle on which any phenomenon is produced (Hayek 
1952: p. 43).
Even though Hayek envisioned a fragmented or dispersed knowledge about eco-
nomic affairs and actions with the purpose of steering economics away from tautolo-
gies of monomial analysis, his spontaneous order in spirit nevertheless resembles a 
Walrasian general equilibrium of dispersed knowledge. (Although one thought of as 
an everlasting equilibrium process, rather than a state of equilibrium.)
If we return to our initial problem of value in economic analysis, we cannot 
really say that Hayek proposed a clear solution. Could we not say that, as regards 
subjectivist theories, he also flirted with the ‘substantialist’ camp, substantialising 
knowledge over labour when it comes to value-creation? We might say he did so 
negatively, by obfuscating the immediacy of the price system by shifting the object 
of knowledge. This resulted in both an implicit and explicit move away from produc-
tion and towards exchange and consumption, from the centrality of price instead of 
value, where distribution becomes the function of individual expectations in price-
terms and practical usefulness of goods. He has this to say on the matter:
Classical political economy broke down mainly because it failed to base its 
explanation of the fundamental phenomenon of value on the same analysis of 
the springs of economic activity which it had so successfully applied to the 
analysis of the more complex phenomena of competition. The labor theory of 
value was the product of a search after some illusory substance of value rather 
than an analysis of the behavior of the economic subject. The decisive step 
in the progress of economics was taken when economists began to ask what 
exactly were the circumstances which made individuals behave toward goods 
in a particular way. To ask the question in this form led immediately to the 
recognition that to attach a definite significance or value to the units of differ-
ent goods was a necessary step in the solution of the general problem which 
1 3
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 
arises everywhere when a multiplicity of ends compete for a limited quantity 
of means (Hayek 1969: p. 136).
Hayek’s critique of “socialist calculation” was actually a critique of naïve sim-
plicity of an existential proposition of unified measure of value (labour) opposed to 
the complex wants and desires any particular individual possesses—his individual 
preference plan and subjective valuation. On the other hand, he also disagreed with 
the early marginalists (Gossen), accusing them of attempting to impose a cardinal 
set of utilities (the problem of cardinal utility), resulting in cumulative utilities of 
aggregated individuals as a social whole (the problem of relative differences in 
intersubjective utilities’ comparison). Crucially for the whole of Hayek’s oeuvre, all 
relations pertain to strict atomization without ever succumbing to totalization, which 
in the last instance, heavily beleaguered him in maintaining an unbiased view of 
economic theory.
3  Connecting the philosophical categories with the scientific 
concepts: the not‑followed reconciliatory path of Alfred Amonn 
and Georg Simmel
Paul Samuelson’s introduction to Economics shows how insignificant the value-
determination actually seemed to him. The volume hardly ever deals exclusively 
with value, staying faithful and consistent with the marginalists in pursuing the scar-
city of resources and the (Pareto) efficiency of distribution. To reiterate: econom-
ics as a science is, in a sense, from the outset unprepared to fully understand and 
develop its object of knowledge. Its initial interest, at least in the modern variant 
from the middle of twentieth century, remains in efficient production, mainly focus-
ing on the reallocation and consumption of merchandise and goods across the globe. 
When searching for value in Economics, it is first mentioned when already in direct 
relation to price: “The central role of markets is to determine the price of goods. A 
price is the value of the good in terms of money […]” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 
2010: p. 27). And then to money: “[m]odern economies today make extensive use 
of money, which provides the yardstick for measuring economic values and is the 
means of payment” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2010: p. 31). One will not find the 
preceding debate in official textbooks; the money-price is the sole determinant of 
economic value, which in turn is a signal for individuals and their subjective plan of 
needs. This kind of logic results in thinking that moneys and prices exist naturally 
‘in the heads’ of exchanging subjects, simultaneously ‘forgetting’ any kind of value-
determining agent at work. The issue with Samuelson’s textbook market-econ-
omy concepts is of course the objection Marx posed with the talk about objective 
forms of thought [Objektive Gedankenformen]. Why is there no value-determining 
mediation substance on the one hand, while on the other the simplest postulates of 
“given and stable preferences” or “stage of society’s technological possibilities” or 
the analytical “ceteris paribus” clause hold sway almost unquestionably? Marx’s 
answer always demanded the strict and thorough interrogation of the relation-
ship between inner connection [innere Zusammenhang] and form of appearance 
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[Erscheinungsform], between content and form, thought as a critique of economic 
categories; it is precisely the gap separating them that leaves economics in the dark, 
undetermined. It, therefore, remains one of the most central and elusive confronta-
tions with marginalist and neoclassical elaboration of the reigning price form and 
money-numéraire valuations in market economies that still anchors us in the realm 
of crude empiricism.
Alfred Amonn attempted to pursue an intermediate route. He aimed to overcome 
and fuse together the shortcomings of this “scientific rupture” by mitigating both 
the philosophical categories with scientific concepts of economics. We can main-
tain that his neo-Kantian inspired distinction between the object of experience 
[Erfahrungsobjekt] and object of knowledge [Erkenntnisobjekt] was actually one of 
the very last attempts to resuscitate the “objectivity” (of social relations; the social, 
third world aside from the worlds of body and mind) in the ʻsocialʼ science of eco-
nomics [Sozialwissenschaft]. Unfortunately, with this approach, he entangled him-
self with Marxʼs above problem of interchanging the logical and the real realms in 
scientific enquiry, leading to confusion in notional unfolding. This pertains in par-
ticular to the handling of objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of social relations 
and the understanding of the social character of labour. However, the problematic 
Amonn observed and sought to resolve was at a later period taken up by T. Adornoʼs 
critique of reigning social structures dominated by “real abstractions”. We shall 
address his conception in the following section. Before we do, let us proceed with 
Amonn’s problem the way Hans-Georg Backhaus sees it: “But mechanics and other 
‘real’ sciences do not in any way operate with ‘pure quantities’, rather with sensuous 
perceptible; just the formal sciences, e.g. mathematics and, only seemingly, econom-
ics know of such ‘pure quantities’ that employ Simmel and Sombart.” (Backhaus 
2012) The price form is the inauguration of the ‘pure quantity’ of ‘living’ numbers, 
or conversely, the evacuation of the qualitative as practiced everywhere in modern 
economics, from neoclassical to Post-Keynesian economics. We can see the consid-
erable ease with which an economist counts the aggregates—capital, labour, GDP, 
current accounts, sovereign debts, etc.—numbers as a presupposed qualitative sub-
strate of price form, perceived as an object of economic inquiry. The latter attains 
its operational objectivity once the numbers are comprehensively ordered on a 
mathematical-logical basis and achieve their signifying merit in actuality. What role 
the number plays in the price form is made apparent in H. Reichelt’s reading of A. 
Amonn’s critique of economic concepts in his Objekt und Grundbegriffe der theore-
tischen Nationalökonomie, in particular in relation to methodological individualism 
and the nature of economic theory as a social science. Reichelt points out how the 
ideality of (subjectivist) methodological individualism (price form as inner relation) 
is blended with the materiality of social character of value-bearer (price-expressed 
measure as outer relation) in a market exchange system. How can the intra-subjec-
tive reflection of values qua prices become socially valid without recourse to some 
a priori consciousness, one that is simultaneously subjective and objective? A. 
Amonn in his Objekt und Grundbegriffe der theoretischen Nationalökonomie and G. 
Simmel in Philosophie des Geldes, both in a neo-Kantian manner, were among the 
last scholars to attempt sorting out the ambiguities of the new current in economics 
at the time; taking the price form as a presupposed form for a socially-valid value 
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expression grounded in quasi-empirical quantification, formalized in mathematical 
syntax and integrated in an economic forecasting model. The recourse to the state-
ment that “[e]conomics is the unity of two worlds, of supersensuous valid one and 
of sensuously experienced one, divided and combined at the same time,” (Reichelt 
2013) was more or less one of the last attempts to salvage this distinction, before the 
rationality of psychological and technical factors (J. Schumpeter) prevailed in social 
objectivity. The category of value now has its form of appearance in the singularity 
of price, i.e. its subjective side, while on the other hand, it establishes the amount of 
units of exchange, its objective side. The factors are thought of as exclusively techni-
cal, facilitating a closed-circuit value-price-money for economics.
What distinguishes Marx from marginalists and mainstream economists is pre-
cisely this shift in the object of knowledge [Erkenntnisobjekt], whose effects we 
chose to call the subtraction of the qualitative. Reichelt refers to it in Amonn in 
the following manner: “The concept of price in theoretical economics (in Amonn’s 
sense, in particular, his ‘object of knowledge’ price-form) has to resolve the next 
problem: Which is the necessary means of expression [Ausdrucksmittel] for this 
inner relation? Technical quantities cannot stand without also applying the outer 
relation. But how does one connect the inner with the outer relation, the social rela-
tion with the technical one?” (Reichelt 2013)6 If we rephrase Reichelt’s argument, 
we can clearly see the last fragments of the objective-subjective relation in Amonn’s 
writing waning away; objectivity is articulated with concrete prices that exist first-
hand subjectively in the ‘heads’ of individuals (Amonn 1937). Their determination 
is solely quantitative, ideally [Ideel] with relations either to numbers or signs, and 
materially constitutes the contents of the form of value unabashedly in money. Its 
technicity, whether as a means of exchange, store of value or unit of account, strips 
it from any ‘metaphysical’ substance, leaving only its counterpart, price and its 
form—not merely as an outer relation of different quanta or numbers, but an a priori 
general inner and social relation of exchanging subjects—as objective unity of value 
(in Menger’s sense). Therefore, the price form with its technical-formal structure 
mediates the relations of exchanging subjects from the outer means of expression to 
a functioning automaton of social actuality.
Why was it that Amonn’s endeavour to elaborate the centring of the price-
form along with methodological individualism and a subjectivist theory of value 
was bound to encounter a Marxist critique? We can see this in I. I. Rubin’s reply 
in “Alfred Amonn und das Objekt der Theoretischen Nationalökonomie” (Rubin 
1929). Amonn correctly identifies the inadequate handling of the object in economic 
science for its reduction of social relations to those between people and things. The 
price form presupposes the relation between exchange-relating individual subjects, 
simultaneously also reflecting a complete social structure; it implies a de facto total-
ity of social actuality. In sensu stricto, Rubin sees the answer in tearing away social 
relations from the social material production process. Rubin (1929), while Amonn 
wanted to find an intermediate route, negotiating both value and social relations 
6 We have tried to show elsewhere how Marx’s value form can be read in the structuralist way with an 
absent cause—the operation of subtraction of the structure (see Kranjc 2019).
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(Amonn 1936). His attempt to invoke exchanging individuals through price form 
to social rationality was for Rubin a clear break with Marx’s analysis of a concrete 
form of social production process. Both Rubin’s and Reichelt’s critique conjoin in 
denying the technical-formal methodology implied by Amonn’s proposition, espe-
cially in the part of a sufficiency of individual exchange to sustain the existence of 
social relations among individuals (Amonn 1911). The following schematic shows 
the dividing line between Marx’s, Amonn’s and Hayekʼs objects of experience (and 
knowledge):
Marx’s schema:    Amonn’s schema:   Hayek
,
s schema: 
Social relations (Verhältnis)     Social relations (Beziehung)            Communication  
among people    of people              network of indviduals
Relations of production  /                          Division of knowledge 
                               among individuals 
A determinate type of                       A determinate type of social              A determinate type of 
social relations of production            relations                individual relations 
(exchange among              (individual exchange relations)          (information exchange 
commodity-producing individuals)                 about individual plans) 
        Value form                                   Price form 
Individual exchange relations are the starting point and the principle based on 
which individuals take their designated places within the process of exchange, 
be it businessmen or owners of capital, workers or landowners, unemployed 
persons, or farmers. Amonn nevertheless attempts a reboot of neoclassical eco-
nomics, returning to Marshall’s partial equilibria and Walras’s general equi-
librium. Once such a parallax shift of object7 has been accomplished, i.e. the 
separation between exchange and production, or conversely, detaching exchange 
from its base or “value-formation” [Verwertung], we have actually lost/gained 
the crucial ability to differentiate between feudal, capitalist or any other mode 
of production. Why lost or gained? If we paraphrase Samuelson’s reference to 
his mentor J. W. Gibbs, we have gained the universality of economic science, 
written in mathematical language.8 However, the price to be paid for its usage 
7 We refer here to K. Karatani’s (Transcritique) (Karatani 2005) and S. Žižek’s (The Parallax View) 
(Žižek 2006) usage of the notion “parallax”.
8 Fritz Matchlup has struck the true essence of Samuelson’s methodological article “Economic Theory 
and Mathematics—an Appraisal”, AER, 42, 1952, by pointing to the “pseudo-problems of the qualitative 
essence”, where the problem of essence is represented right with the conceptual character of value (p. 
66). The question, one overshadowed by K. Gödel, arises whether “mathematical language” is capable of 
supplying all the qualitative moments of the concept value or is it rather a pseudo-problem of “transla-
tions” among different languages.
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is relatively high for economists: first, economics is faced with the continuous 
accusations of their categories being of pure quantitative character, useful in 
mathematics, astrophysics, conditionally in mathematized physics, but inoper-
able in economics; and second, all quantities expressed with the price form nec-
essarily presuppose the means of their expression in prices; there is always an 
ex-nihilo presupposed money commodity. The commensurability of products is 
already presupposed in price form as a unity of external technical relations of 
pure quantities and inner social relations of exchanging individuals—an objec-
tively valid social form. Marx would have been very unhappy with this solution: 
he would have liked to have known just where this pertinence of form comes 
from and why this content would assume the form it does. No answer is given to 
this question by any of the aforementioned economists, because for economics, 
the problem does not exist; once the price form is presupposed and individuals 
finish doing their valuations ‘in their heads’ the process is at its end. In this case, 
one cannot speak of “real and empirically measured facts”, but rather of ideal 
enumerable digits, existing in the subjects’ consciousness.
Amonn’s case designates two sides of the same problem: on the one hand, the 
content and form of value immanent to economic science of “pure quantities”, 
and on the other, the incompleteness of formal systems or languages in retaining 
the qualitative moments (the undecidabilities, etc.). We mentioned the critique 
of the first side in the context of Rubin’s insistence on determinate social form 
of relations of production, namely the incidence of commodity labour (as labour 
force) and its specific site in the structure of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. However, such a structure is made obsolete in Amonn’s handling of social 
relations [Austauschbeziehungen], which are grounded solely on the formal 
seller—buyer axis. As Rubin succinctly observed, it was a decisive break and 
shift between Marx’s and Amonn’s understanding of social relationships; from 
the production process to exchange process. When this is done, the price form 
supersedes the value form seemingly naturally, evolution-like, the exchange 
relations become the content of the form of exchange and entirely devoid of any 
production ballast. Now, to the second part of our problem, i.e. the objective 
value stemming from price form. Backhaus justifiably questions the shortfalls in 
the conceptions of price phenomenon, as its “substance” and “measure” are not 
empirically quantifiable physical currents of goods, nor do they attain any quali-
tative determinations with mathematical expression in itself. The problem of the 
concept of price persists in a subject’s “pure thought and ideally countable” self-
conscious images of economic objects. “The objective similarity is a metaeco-
nomic condition of possibility, not just for determining the scaling of economic 
quanta, but also adding, and even further to lay down the equations between 
monetary and real levels of macroeconomic analysis.” (Backhaus 2011) The 
similarity of these (macro)economic categories can only ever be pre-imposed, 
for they do not sustain any quality of their own—as opposed to e.g. tempera-
ture, colour, length. Rather, they are ‘abstract’ quantities of capital, value-added, 
debt, etc., that which relies on sensuous-supersensuous character of economic 
categories (value, money, interest, etc.)—their un-decidedness.
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4  A solution?: a specific subtractive structure entailing the real 
abstraction
Marx’s dialectical unfolding of notions not only addresses the empirical content 
of categories (the quantitative volumes of products and aggregates, such as invest-
ments or savings, etc.), but also deals with the qualitative moment immanent in a 
category’s unfolding. On the other hand, when it comes to price form, economists 
made a compromise to do away with the labour theory or any other substantialist 
theory of value and go for the simplicity of money-mediated exchange ratios. Vol-
ume three of Marx’s Capital explores the transitional processes of values onto their 
forms of appearance (profits—interests, rents) as “metamorphoses”, but it does so 
from an entirely different epistemological perspective of object-analysis. The other 
serious issue is the question of money-commodity; before we can even speak of 
exchanges among commodities, we first have to reduce their heterogeneous nature 
to a common base. Even if we do away with labour as substance, what remains is 
the problematic handling of the concept of money that ‘equates’ all products as a 
homogenous objective-value unity [Objektive Werteinheit]. Recall how Marx posits 
the commodity exchange mediating values with a general equivalent that de facto 
already always is money. Only through a “social act” [gesellschaftliche Tat] or force 
can an object actually become money, but there already exists a presupposition of a 
general equivalent of products, making them homogenous as values. Marx does not 
have to succumb to premises and axioms as G. Debreu, F. A von Hayek or P. Samu-
elson are obliged to when handling monetary market exchange, since his dialectical 
approach retains the inner-theoretical unfolding of commodities as values to money, 
i.e. he upholds the gap between content and form, thereby opening the continuous 
path of analysing the trinity formula (capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wage). As 
Marx puts it:
In the case of the simplest categories of the capitalist mode of production, and 
even of commodity-production, in the case of commodities and money, we 
have already pointed out the mystifying character that transforms the social 
relations, for which the material elements of wealth serve as bearers in produc-
tion, into properties of these things themselves (commodities) and still more 
pronouncedly transforms the production relation itself into a thing (money). 
All forms of society, in so far as they reach the stage of commodity-production 
and money circulation, take part in this perversion (Marx 1991: p. 965).
In capital—profit, or still better capital—interest, land—rent, labour—wages, 
in this economic trinity represented as the connection between the component 
parts of value and wealth in general and its sources, we have the complete mys-
tification of the capitalist mode of production, the conversion of social rela-
tions into things, the direct coalescence of the material production relations 
with their historical and social determination. It is an enchanted, perverted, 
topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their 
ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time directly as mere things 
(Marx 1991: p. 969).
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Every economic science remains the captive of an “enchanted, perverted, topsy-
turvy world” for refusing to account for “irrational”, “a-conceptual” [begriffslose] 
forms, ones it nonetheless automatically uses. Here, the price-form of production 
cost is a form of alienation; the scientific world closed in on itself, where natural 
scarcity and rational principle operate as the sole two modes of production, distribu-
tion, exchange and consumption. But let us continue with value and money. When 
it comes to price form, it conveys a value expression, be it in numéraire, currency, 
index points, basis points, etc., formally satisfying the necessary conditions of meas-
uring unit and quanta for a ratio-type equation. In Walras’s Éléments d’économie 
politique pure one can observe how value can be posited as an a priori consequence 
of scarcity, simultaneously determining exchange value—and in one single stroke 
also presupposing money-commodity for transaction’s counterpart (Walras 1926). 
The relation between two exchange values is simply expressed with money, which 
by the same token as a corollary also determines the value-standard, i.e. the unit 
of value. Walras posits such “empirical” quantifications to more closely conform 
economics to a prestigious group of mathematical and physical sciences. Follow-
ing Walras’ line of reasoning, we end up in a peculiar rationalization of mathematic 
formalization, superseding any kind of experience of the sensible by deducing the-
orems, lemmas and proofs on economic categories (market, exchange, production, 
utility, etc.) exclusively from formal syntax.
We have sketched how economic discourse treated the concept of value and 
tried to show where the “break” occurs. The analysis relied on different historical 
approaches to economic theory, from classical, Marx’s to Austrian and other per-
spectives. The classical and Marx’s account of human labour as substance of value 
has been replaced with subjective aspirations of individual knowledge-reflective 
subjects keen on bargaining through a price mechanism. Although human labour 
and craftsmanship are still needed to mould and transform different materials to 
introduce a final product onto the market, we encounter value on the side of the sub-
jective (individual expectations) unique dynamic of market forces. We should point 
out that this parallax move in conceptual comprehension is not the result of eco-
nomic science’s inquiry into scarce resources and their allocation; it is the result of a 
different kind of competition: between research programmes, particularly with a sci-
entific-methodological-philosophical take on epistemological questions. Apart from 
Marx, this aspect can be clearly seen also in the case of Alfred Amonn, who wanted 
to shift the object of economics from that of resources (Wirtschaftswissenschaft) to 
social phenomena (Sozialwissenschaft) (Amonn 1911: pp. 161–162). The aim was 
to bridge the gap between Marx’s formulation of social relations of production and 
the opposing (quasi-)empirical subjective plans of individuals. He was indeed from 
the Austrian bend when it came seeing the market-based economy as one populated 
with exchanging individuals taking on objective unity of value represented with the 
price form and in the price system (Amonn 1935). The unsurpassable difference 
between him and Hayek was the understanding of the social relation: for the latter 
it meant a technicality, while for Amonn it represented a supersensuous property 
of the social world. How does the supersensuous character come to be? Precisely 
through the mediation of money—the pure materiality of price abstractions in our 
consciousness.
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To recap what we have thus far said on price form expressed with money: there 
has to exist something, an object of interest, for two opposite sides in exchange, each 
of which has to have both, use and exchange value, or at least some other form or 
support [Träger] of this unity. Once this is achieved, we have the necessary condi-
tions for a price(tag) to exist, but we have not yet sorted out the riddle of money 
commodity (and—for the Marxian-inclined reader—neither have we addressed the 
problem of the value-substance). Textbook economics sees it as logically deducible 
from a good’s relative scarcity and our need for it. Amonn, on the other hand, and 
his objection to the existence of a social relation mediated by prices is ripe for fur-
ther study amid its conceptual weakness. This dimension remains opaque also in 
Hayek’s argument; he circumvents it with yet another a-conceptual form, i.e. the 
subjectively inclined order of “tacit knowledge”, of distinct usages of things. Such 
pragmatism can only lay the groundwork for a retroactive positing of price form as 
an a priori form of our consciousness that once again brings with it the concept of 
value.
The “New Reading of Marx” of Backhaus and Reichelt tracks the “metaphysical 
category” of value by Georg Simmel, providing an answer for the divide between 
objective and subjective value; the encounter of the notions of price and money in 
the consciousness of exchanging subjects. Here, consciousness is given the task of 
providing ex nihilo the concept of money out of price content to operate as an objec-
tive factor for economics. If we paraphrase Marx, money and price did not emerge 
‘in human heads’, neither accidentally nor simultaneously; rather, they are the dia-
lectical outcome of an unfolded contradiction of social relations in a determinate 
mode of production. Put conversely, for Hayek to deduce the price evaluation of 
products, the price already has to have some qualitative determination, a presup-
posed moment, with some third—a general equivalent in the form of money com-
modity. Think of each separate quantum of things, without any qualitative reference 
of measure, just in itself; it is completely senseless to compare one with the other. 
Methodological individualism can formally expect of individual subjects to rely on 
their sober judgement of every good, but can it really account for all simultaneous 
relations between goods? It does not, for consciousness uses the general equilib-
rium as a necessity to relate objects of exchange and uses a social act to pinpoint 
a money commodity that de facto sutures the exchange process in universal units. 
Also, it can deal with Jevons’s or Walras’s ratios of prices, meaning they are model-
laden abstractions, but once the absolute prices are the object, there is a categori-
cal difference for the latter on their subjective–objective or sensuous-supersensuous 
character. How to overcome this? The students of Theodor Adorno, Backhaus and 
Reichelt opt for his understanding of “real abstraction”9 to equilibrate the diverse 
range of products on some abstract generality (i.e. labour)—a third. What does 
9 The first usage of the phrase “Real abstraction” is accredited to Georg Simmel in his work Philoso-
phy of Money (cited in the last section). Indeed, it was the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel Geistige und 
körperliche Arbeit that first extensively explicated on this notion and had later also lead T. Adorno to 
think of exchange abstraction [Tauschabstraktion] as a central critical concept (see Sohn-Rethel 1989: 
pp. 221–226).
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this real abstraction entail? First, it postulates the existence of economic value as a 
metaphysical category, if value should have any objective site in actuality. Meaning 
it exists in a ‘between space’ [Zwischenwelt], residing both within consciousness 
and also outside of it; Simmel here talks of a parallel between Plato and Medieval 
universalities, that of ante rem, in re, post rem—the moment in re of value always 
residing in a thing in and for itself (and not as only post rem, as is the case for sub-
jectivists). The equivalent, value expressed in money units, therefore belongs to the 
supersensuous order of things—this is what conjoins with Marx’s objective forms of 
thought [objektive Gedankenformen] in a capitalist mode of production. The long-
standing pertinent problem of subjectivist theory of value therefore remains: if, for 
us, the valuations exist only ‘in our heads’, how are we to think social objectivity 
when it comes to the universal character of value in capitalism? Economic science 
supplied us with an aporetic abstractionist-positing-in-advance of concepts like pur-
chasing power, capital stock, value-added, etc. to cover up the dilemma. Purchasing 
power can formally be turned into univariate content of the price form with consid-
erable ease, closing in the circuit from production to consumption for macroeco-
nomics. The question nevertheless endures: where does all this come from? Marx’s 
now already notorious answer that economists (of his as much as our own time) 
have all occupied themselves with the question of content and their conditions, but 
have neglected the parallel unfolding of forms pertaining to this content—commod-
ity form, value form, capital form and all higher orders of forms. And if we follow 
Marx’s argument all the way through, we must accept that “in money realised price 
and its substance [wealth itself]” is introduced via money as a singular commod-
ity, whose generality embodies all particularities of the exchanged merchandise. 
Forming a completed totality of commodity-universe money is then always sub-
tracted from the exchange process and is absent in the end result. Marx’s dialectical 
unfolding of the notion can be summarized, conversely, in the following way: a set 
of concrete types of labour also contains labour in general, abstract labour closing 
in on totality, only insofar as this abstract labour is subtracted from the structure. 
Through dialectical steps, Marx develops an analytical scission of these notions 
(commodity, value, money, etc.) onto two levels: the sensuous and the supersensu-
ous (abstract). This remains one of the cornerstones for our concurrent critique of 
economic categories.
Simmel very much believed it is not all about the quantitative measurements in 
the heads, allowing for the existence of an “other between-world” with reference 
to Marx’s thesis on an alienated science of political economy. Austrians and cur-
rents of mainstream economics did away with labour as substance of value/com-
modities, as they stripped market exchange of any abstract universality (money com-
modity) without any consequence. Marx on the other hand, at least form Grundrisse 
onwards, proposed a specific structure of capitalist relations of production in which 
labour in general should be perceived as an abstraction, as an abstraction subtracted 
from production totality that mediates social objectivity. Simmel was well aware of 
this when he wrote the following passage in The Philosophy of Money:
As soon as one realizes the extent to which human action in every sphere of 
mental activity operates with abstractions, it is not as strange as it may seem 
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at first glance that not only the study of the economy but the economy itself is 
constituted by a real abstraction from the comprehensive reality of valuations. 
The forces, relations and qualities of things—including our own nature—
objectively form a unified whole which has to be broken down by our interests 
into a multitude of independent series or motives to enable us to deal with 
it. Every science investigates phenomena that are homogeneous and clearly 
distinguished from the problems of other sciences, whereas reality ignores 
boundaries and every section of the world presents an aggregate of tasks for all 
the sciences (Simmel 2009: p. 42).
The science Marx proposed indeed addresses these issues because it encourages 
thinking about the conditions behind a possible science capable of resolving the spe-
cific structure of sites in a determinate (capitalist) mode of production. If the real 
abstraction has any serious enterprise in sublating the hegemony of the positivism 
of price form, it is precisely to engage the notional world of economics negatively, 
imposing a gap where the subtraction of the qualitative can appear.
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